Archive for the ‘District Court’ Category

Jury Awards Johnson & Johnson Subsidiary $1.67 Billion

July 2, 2009

In an infringement suit in the Eastern District of Texas, Johnson & Johnson subsidiary Centocor, Inc., was awarded $1.67 billion in infringement damages.  The jury found that Abbott Laboratories’ arthritis drug, Humira® (adalimumab), infringed U.S. Patent No. 7,070,775, owned jointly by Centocor and NYU, and that the infringement was willful.  Humira® competes with Centocor’s own arthritis drug, Remicade® (infliximab).

After a trial that lasted a single week, the jury took less than a day to award Centocor lost profit damages of $1,168,466,000 and reasonable royalty damages of $504,128,000.  Double recovery of both lost profits and reasonable royalties is generally not allowed in infringement cases, but sometimes a hybrid of the two may be awarded as damages if, for example, lost profits are difficult to prove.  In this case, it appears that the jury verdict form would allow for both if only a portion of the lost profits could be proven.  Doubtless, this potential ambiguity will be part of the post-trial motions filed in this case.

This infringement verdict may be the largest ever awarded for a patent infringement case.  It should be noted, however, that Abbott launched Humira® in 2002 and its 2008 sales of the drug topped $4.5 billion or about 15% of the company’s total revenue, while sales of Remicade® topped $3.75 billion. 

Both J&J and Abbott have been lobbying against limitations on damage awards for infringement verdicts in the current patent reform debate.  Many earlier high infringement verdicts have been overturned in post-trial motions or on appeal, including the $1.52 billion verdict awarded to Alcatel-Lucent against Microsoft in 2007 over digital music patents.  Judge Ward will shortly entertain such post-trial motions in this case.  These mechanisms seem to be effective for curbing unwarranted damage verdicts.

Update: Debate on Gene Patenting Continues

June 17, 2009

As an update to my post on the ACLU suit challenging the patenting of genes, Kevin Noonan of Patent Docs has a great post from yesterday that discusses how the debate has gone from patent law circles to the mainstream.

He contends, and I agree with him, that most of the anti-patenting arguments in the debate are based on a misunderstanding and outright mischaracterization of the law and science surrouding the issues.  He references editorials in the New York Times on the issue as well as debates on NPR and adequately addresses most of the arguments against gene patenting.  There is a fairly extensive debate in the comments to the post between Dr. Noonan and Professor David Koepsell that is worth checking out.

Today, Patent Docs has a post referencing an editorial in USA Today written by Jim Greenwood, President and CEO of the Biotechnology Industrial Organization (BIO) that the isolation and purification of genes has led and is leading to many new therapies, vaccines, drugs, and other innovations in the health care and pharmaceutical field.

I would suggest that as long as the other sections of the Patent Act that preclude patents whose claims are not novel, non-obvious, or adequately disclosed and enabled, there is really no need to have a particular prohibition on a particular category of subject matter per se.  This applies equally to genes, software, and business methods.

District Court Applies Bilski Even More Broadly

April 14, 2009

In an opinion last month, Judge Marilyn Patel of the Northern District of California entered summary judgment of invalidity against two claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,029,154, Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., (No. C 04-03268).  The court, applying the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Bilski, held claims 2 and 3 invalid for failure to claim patentable subject matter.

Claim 3 was directed to a method claim for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction over the Internet:

3. A method for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction over the Internet comprising the steps of:
a) obtaining information about other transactions that have utilized an Internet address that is identified with the credit card transaction;
b) constructing a map of credit card numbers based upon the other transactions and;
c) utilizing the map of credit card numbers to determine if the credit card transaction is valid.

Claim 2 was a Beauregard-type claim directed to a computer readable medium containing program instructions for detecting fraud in a credit card transaction:

2. A computer readable medium containing program instructions for detecting fraud in a credit card transaction between a consumer and a merchant over the Internet, wherein execution of the program instructions by one or more processors of a computer system causes the one or more processors to carry out the steps of:
a) obtaining credit card information relating to transactions from the consumer; and
b) verifying the credit card information based upon values of plurality of parameters, in combination with information that identifies the consumer, and that may provide an indication whether the credit card transaction is fraudulent,
wherein each value among the plurality of parameters is weighted in the verifying step according to an importance, as determined by the merchant, of that value to the credit card transaction, so as to provide the merchant with a quantifiable indication of whether the credit card transaction is fraudulent,
wherein execution of the program instructions by one or more processors of a computer system causes the one or more processors to carry out the further steps of;
obtaining information about other transactions that have utilized an Internet address that is identified with the credit card transaction; constructing a map of credit card numbers based upon the other transactions; and utilizing the map of credit card numbers to determine if the credit card transaction is valid.

Method Claim

Regarding the method claim, the plaintiff argued that the methods met Bilski‘s transformation requirement by manipulating both credit card numbers and IP addresses.  The court, however, disagreed, holding that “the claimed methods simply obtain and compare intangible data pertinent to business risks.”  The court reasoned that “transformation” requires a fundamental change, while “manipulation” does not.  Although credit cards and credit card numbers may be manipulated, they are not transformed.  The court further held that credit card numbers are not physical objects; Bilski requires a transformation of an “‘article’–i.e., any physical object or substance, or an electronic signal representative of any physical object or substance.”  The court also rejected the IP address argument, holding that the IP addresses are not transformed or manipulated in the claim.

The plaintiff also argued that the method meets the machine prong of Bilski‘s test because it is performed over the Internet, a series of general and special purpose computers, routers, hubs, switches, and other specialized hardware.  The court held that the Internet is not “a particular machine” as required by Bilski.  Because the Internet is not essential to the claimed method, the court characterized its inclusion as “insignificant extra-solution activity.”  Thus, method claim 3 was held invalid as failing to meet either prong of the test set forth in Bilski.

Beauregard Claim

The plaintiff in the case argued that Bilski‘s machine-or-transformation test should not apply to claim 2 because it is not a method claim, but rather a Beauregard claim.  Beauregard claims are directed to computer-readable media that contain computer programs for performing patented methods.  As such, they are not considered methods, but rather tangible items such as computer disks, tapes, hard drives, or the like.

The court reviewed the Federal Circuit’s opinion In re Beauregard that created such claims and other cases that cite to it.  The court noted that there is actually no decision on the merits in Beauregard.  Instead, the PTO simply dropped the appeal and agreed with the patent applicant that such claims were patentable.  Thus, Beauregard is not binding precedent.

Like Auntie Mame’s Uncle Beauregard, the footing of the so-called Beauregard doctrine is anything but sure.

Because claim 2 refers to a process implemented through “unspecified program instructions,” Beauregard would not even save the claim in this case.  The court cited the Board of Patent Appeals decision Ex Parte Cornea-Hasegan from earlier this year to support this part of its opinion.

Conclusion

The court concluded its opinion with several interesting quotations:

In analyzing Bilski, one is led to ponder whether the end has arrived for business method patents . . .

Although the majority declined to say so explicitly, Bilski‘s holding suggests a perilous future for most business method patents.

The closing bell may be ringing for business method patents, and their patentees may find they have become bagholders (shareholders left holding worthless stocks).

A reading of the Cybersource court’s opinion does indeed lead one to believe that business method patents are in peril.  The court does provide a bit of hope for such methods, but their value will be much less than previously supposed.  The court noted that the computer programs and methods were “unspecified” and “intangible”.  One option that may still be available to patent applicants would be to include a great deal more detail regarding various implementations of business methods and programs implementing such methods.  This detail could be added to the claims to help meet the machine-or-transformation test.  Of course, more detailed claims leave clever infringers more ways to avoid them.

Federal Circuit Argument on PTO Rules Set for Friday

December 3, 2008

The Federal Circuit will hear oral argument in Tafas v. Dudas on Friday, December 5.  The case is extremely important for patent applicants.

In August 2007, the US Patent and Trademark Office issued final rules that would limit the number of continuation applications and the number of claims that patent applicants could file in their applications.  The plaintiffs challenged the rules and Senior Judge James Cacheris granted summary judgment in their favor in April 2008.  Judge Cacheris ruled that the PTO did not have the authority to pass these rules because they were substantive in nature as they affected the existing rights of patent owners and patent applicants.  The PTO appealed this decision.

As for how the Federal Circuit will rule in this case, I would hope that the court will affirm Judge Cacheris.  It is, however, difficult to tell what they might do.  Surely, the court will recognize the importance of the case given that numerous amici have filed briefs, mostly in support of the plaintiffs, but a couple also support the PTO’s position.  It is unlikely that any Federal Circuit opinion would be issued before about February, but given the importance of the case, it could be sooner (or later).

If these rules are allowed to take affect, they will require serious changes to current patent application and prosecution practices.  The rules could also have serious consequences for patent applications that have been previously filed, and even for patents that have already issued.

Stay tuned . . .

UPDATE: The panel for the argument this morning includes Judges Rader, Bryson, and Prost.  More later . . .


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